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RECENT DECISIONS

however, that where a nuisance exists the owner of property must
inform trespassers if he knows of their presence and of its existence.7
And it is established that one who merely suffers or acquiesces in
the use of his premises, or permits others to enter thereon for their
own purposes, 'does not owe to such persons the duty to those who
enter by invitation. 8 It appears, therefore, that the plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendant unless it could be shown that
the latter acted wilfully and with intent to injure him.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MUNICIPAL COURT; JURISDICTION WHERE

AMOUNT EXCEEDS ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS.-Five parties, named
as plaintiffs in one summons, brought an action in the municipal
court of the city of New York demanding separate and distinct
judgments. The amount involved exceeded one thousand dollars
and defendant denied the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action. Held, there was but one action
and but one summons, and the amount demanded in that summons
exceeded one thousand dollars. Hence the municipal court was without jurisdiction to entertain the action. Dilworth v. Yellow Taxi
Corp., 220 App. Div. (N. Y.) 772 (2nd Dep't. 1927), reversing 127
Misc. 543.
The Civil Practice Act' provides than all persons may be joined
in one action as plaintiffs where the right to relief arises out of the
same transaction. A section of the Municipal Court Code incorporates this section into the code. 2 However the jurisdiction of the
municipal court is limited to actions where the amount demanded
in the summons does not exceed one thousand dollars. 3 So that.
desirable as it may be that all actions arising out of one transaction
be set out in one summons and complaint by the various plaintiffs
this cannot be done in the municipal court where the amounts sued
for by the respective plaintiffs total in the aggregate more than one
thousand dollars. The Court of Appeals has stated that the purpose
of the Civil Practice Act provision 4 is "to lessen the delay and expense of litigation by permitting the claims of different plaintiffs to
be decided in one action instead of many when, although legally
separate and distinct, they nevertheless so involve common questions
and spring out of identical or related transactions that their common
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trial may be had with fairness to the different parties." 5 The Appellate Division in its decision restricts the operation of this section
so that it cannot apply to all cases in the municipal court. The
question is now before the Court of Appeals for final determination 6
but it is doubtful whether a result different from that of the Appellate Division will be found. The practice frowned upon is barred
upon sufficient though technical grounds and cannot be permitted under
the present procedure. Remedial legislation giving the court jurisdiction in cases of this nature appears to be the only solution.
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HOME FOR STUDENTS BELONGING TO FRATERNITY NOT ENTITLED TO TAX
EXEMPTION AS A BENEFICENT AND CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION.-

The plaintiff sought to tax the real property of the defendant,
which claimed exemption under paragraph 7 of section 2 of the
Revenue Act of Illinois (Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1925, p. 1998) providing
that "all property of institutions of public charity, all property of
beneficent and charitable organization, * * * when such property
is actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent
purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit"
shall be exempt from taxation. The defendant was a fraternal
educational association conducted, not for pecuniary profit, but for
the purpose, as stated in its charter, of providing a home for student
members of the fraternity, at a moderate cost to those able to pay
and gratuitously to those unable to pay. The highest rate charged
was shown at the trial to be lower than the cost of similar ac6ommodations elsewhere in the locality. Its officers served without compensation and no dividends or profit accrued to any member of the
fraternity. The property consisted of a house in the city of Chicago
occupied by members of the fraternity attending the University of
Chicago, and was acquired by donations from alumni members and
a mortgage on the premises. It was maintained partly by members
attending school and partly by donations from alumni. The trial
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that defendant was
not an institution of public charity, nor a beneficent and charitable
organization, so as to be exempt from taxation under the Revenue
Act. This decision was affirmed on appeal. People ex rel. Carr,
County Collector v. Alpha Pi of Phi Kappa Sigma Educational
Ass'n. of University of Chicago, 158 N. E. 213 (Illinois, 1927).
The question at issue in this case was whether or not the defendant was an institution of public charity, or a beneficent and
charitable organization, as contemplated by the Revenue Act. It is
requisite to a public charity that it be for the benefit of the public
or some portion thereof, but it is not necessary that a charity should
be open to every one in the community.' Since it is the duty of the
public to care for the indigent and the poor, any institution which
5
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